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Summary  findings
For sustained growth, a developing economy must  Philippines, however, the outcome of these policies was
provide productive employment opportunities in  unique. Measures designed to discourage agriculture,
nonagricultural sectors. As the economy grows,  rather than encourage the industrial sector, caused both
employment shifts from the agricultural sector to  it and the agricultural sector to deteriorate.
industrial and service sectors.  Takeuchi and Hagino criticize financial conglomerates
The move away from agriculture happens because of  for creating highly oligopolistic market structures that
the decline in the income elasticity of food as incomes  were responsible for the inefficient use of resources and
rise, the discovery of substitutes for agricultural  unbalanced income distribution. Many of the
products, and rapid technological changes in agriculture  conglomerates (dubbed "landed capitalists") channeled
in response to shortages of land.  massive state resources into such traditional economic
The economic policies developing economies pursue  activities as sugar and coconut farming, limiting the
are typically designed to accelerate this structural  country's industrial diversification.
transformation by favoring the industrial sector. In the
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1. Stagnancy in the industrial structure in the Philippine economy
For sustained growth to be realized in developing economies, it is necessary that
more productive employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors be available
to the people.  And in order for economic growth in developing countries to be a
sustained growth,  it  is  necessary that  the  country's  non-agricultural  sector  is
developed to the extent that it can provide these employment opportunities.
Both economic theory and modern economic history show that productivity growth
in  non-agricultural  sectors  has  consistently outweighed that  of  the  agricultural
sector.  Thus, as development progresses, employment, which had been centered
around the agricultural sector, becomes more and more dependent on the industrial
and services sectors.  This relationship between economic growth, and the move
away from agriculture can also be explained in terms of the decline in the income
elasticity of food  as  incomes rise,  the  discovery of  substitutes for  agricultural
products, and the rapid technological change in agriculture in response to shortages
of land. Economic policies pursued by some developing economies are typically
designed to  accelerate  this  structural  transformation by  favoring the  industrial
sector.
In the case of the Philippines,  however, the outcome of these policies has been quite
unique.  Measures  towards  industrialization that  were  designed to  discourage
agriculture  did  not  drastically change the  industrial  structure,  and  rather  than
encouraging the industrial sector, led to  the deterioration of industry, as well as
agriculture.  We can imply from this that there were non-market forces at work in
This paper  was  prepared  for the Workshop  entitled  "Political  Economy  of Rural  Development
Strategies  ", to be held  on May  5-6  at the  World  Bank,  Washington,  DC.
The  authors  would  like to acknowledge  the contribution  of the National  Statistical  Coordination
Board,  Banko  Sentral  ng Pilipinas  (Central  Bank  of the  Philippines)  in collecting  data.
1the resource (capital and labor) allocation  between agriculture  and non-agriculture
sectors.
Table 1 shows the changes in the sectoral composition of aggregate output and
employment.  Industry's  share  of  GDP  rose  and  agriculture's share  fell,
demonstrating  a familiar  pattern of development,  but this change took place only
from the mid-1950s to mid-1970s.  In terms of employment,  the share of those
employed  in industry failed to grow even in that period, suggesting  that the service
and agricultural  industries  were the major sources  of employment.  This stagnancy
in the industrial structure is particularly  noticeable when we make international
comparisons (Table 2). Table 2(a) shows the percentage shares of agricultural
output in total  GDP from  1977 to  1990, and Table 2(b) shows those of the
manufacturing  industry from 1970  to 1990.  The percentage  decline  in the share of
agriculture  over the period is only 9.6% and the percentage  share of manufacturing
in GDP did not change at all.  This feature stands out even in comparison with
other South Asian  economies.
Some other important issues to  be  discussed are the efficiencies of  resource
utilization  and income  distribution.  A transfer  of capital  out of agriculture  will lead
to sustained  growth only if this is done efficiently  towards more socially  profitable
investments coupled with a  relatively balanced income distribution.  Therefore,
"balanced"  intersectoral  resource  flows should  be evaluated  not only on the relative
size of flows but also by these criteria.
In the case of the Philippines,  the inefficient  use of resources and the unbalanced
income distribution seem to be as problematic  as the relative size of intersectoral
resource allocation.  Some great financial  conglomerates  are criticized  for creating
highly oligopolistic market  structures which are  seen  as  responsible for  the
inefficient  resource  use and uneven  income  distribution.  Many of them are "landed
capitalists", and they have channeled massive state resources into traditional
economic  activities  like sugar and coconut farming,  lirniting  the country's  industrial
diversification.
2.  Capital  Allocation  Between the Agriculture  and Non-Agriculture  Sectors.
In this project, aggregated intersectoral resource allocation is estimated in each
sample country using regional data (taking the "regional approach"); agricultural
and non-agricultural  regions are defined, and transfers from one to  another is
regarded as  an  intersectoral transaction.  This  approach is  adopted as  a
convenient  way to gauge intersectoral  allocation.
2However, classifying  the regions into the two types of regions is difficult  in some
cases due to the ambiguity  of the sectoral distribution  of output and employment  in
many  regions.  In addition,  the limited  availability  of data makes  it difficult  to cover
all  kinds of  resource transactions and  to  compare private  and  public-based
allocations  on the same basis.
Thus, we try to estimate the capital allocation 2 between  the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors in two different ways: one is by taking the above-mentioned
regional approach and the other is a sectoral approach  by using input-output tables.
In this discussion,  our estimations  using the sectoral approach covers intersectoral
capital transfer between agricultural and non-agricultural  sectors 3 from 1961 to
1982, when I-0  tables and government contributions  data(taxes and subsidies)  to
capital transfers are available 4.
Here, net real resources transferred from one sector to another and the financial
contributions  of one sector  to another are, by construction,  equal . Transferred  net
real resources (the trade balance)  can be extracted  from 1-0 tables and the financial
contribution  of one sector to another is equal  to the net private flows [saving(S)  less
2 We  have  not touched  on the labor  force  allocation  between  the different  sectors  in this  discussion.
The following  estimation  of intersectoral  capital transfers  also excludes  factor  returns  (wvages).
Regarding  the labor  force  allocation  between  agriculture  and industrv  . the industrialization  of the
Philippines  has been criticized  by many  as being  extremely  capital-intensive  compared  to other
East  Asian  economies.
Under  capital-intensive  industrialization,  Metro  Manila  and  its peripheral  areas  limited  labor
absorption  from  the agricultural  sector  (rural  regions),  resulting  in the stagnant  industrial  structure
described  above.  Leon(1982)  estimated  the intersectoral  capital flows as well as intersectoral
labor  flows  and using these,  found  a capital/labor  ratio in terms of flows.  He discovered  huge
capital  transfers  from the agriculture  to non-agriculture  industries,  coupled  with  a relatively  small
outflow  of labor.  This  suggests  an industrial  structure  biased  in favor  of capital-intensive  projects
and  minimal  growth  in agricultural  labor  productivity.
3  Accounting  framework  and estimation  procedures  are based on Leon (1982),  with slight
modifications. See  appendix.
4 1-0  tables  are available  for  the years 1961,  65,  74. 79,  83.  85 and  govermnent  taxes  and subsidies
to agriculture  can be obtained  for the years 1960-82  from the World  Bank's survey (1990).
Intersectoral  capital flows are estimated  by combining  the two sources. Trade balances  in-
between  1-0 years are estimated  as straight line extensions. Hence, we are able to obtain
intersectoral  capital  transfers  from 1961  to 1982.
3investment(I)] plus  govermnent receipts  [taxes(T)] 5. The  net  real  resources
transferred from the agricultural to non-agricultural  sectors are, for example, the
difference  between the food and raw materials del:ivered  to the non-agricultural
sector and the industrial consumer goods  and indlustrial  inputs flowing in the
opposite direction.
Table 3 shows net capital outflows as a proportion of agricultural Gross Value
Added. The column second from the left shows the marketed  capital transfers (S-
I+T) which can be directly obtained from the 1-0 tables. (S-I) equals the private
based net capital outflows, and public  based net capital outflows  are represented by
(T-G).  The total  net  flows aggregated by these two  (S-I+T-G) are  shown
separately.
As shown in table 3, the agricultural  sector maintained  net capital outflows to the
non-agricultural  sector over the course of the period.  As for the public based
transfers,  the government  spent more in agriculture  than it gained  from the taxation
of the sector during most of the years surveyed.  However, the government-led
inflows  were not sufficient  to compensate  for the privat:e  based capital outflows.  We
can also see that a significant  share of transfers out of agriculture  occurred during
the first half  of 1970s 6.
Figure 1 indicates  that the domestic agriculture  to non-agriculture  terms of trade
(TOT) improved  during the first half of the 1970s,  which may  be responsible  for the
relatively large capital outflows (equal to  the surplus in  the trade balance by
definition)  7. TOT  can affect the sectoral IS balance in a  different way. TOT
5 To obtain  total net capital balance  (IS balance) of the agricultural,  sector,  government-led  transfers
(G) to the sector should be added to the market capital transfers (S-I+T) which can be obtained
from 1-0 tables.  These transfers are, for'example. government expenditures on infrastructure.
research, agricultural  support services  and so forth.
6 The World  Bank (1990) estimated the volume of transfers which occurred as a result of pricing
policies,  as well as otler policies, in four major crops and showed  that the transfers out of the sector
were intensified in the first half of the 1970s.  Note, however.  that the transfers are not equal to
the IS balance  of the agricultural sector.
7 Movements in intersectoral  terms of trade  can influence industrial  structures  by
their  effects on  intersectoral  resource transfers.  Figure 2 shows the  relationship
between coefficients of variations of domestic sector TOT (the ratio of agricultural  and
manufacturing  deflators)  and  the  extent  of changes  of industrial  structures  (the
percentage  decline of agriculture's  share  of GDP plus  the  percentage  growth  of
4improvements  can  affect the  pattern  of profitability of the  sector,  increasing net
capital inflows in the long term.
Domestic  agricultural  terms  of  trade  depends  on  many  factors,  such  as  the
international  terms  of  trade,  domestic  pricing policies,  and  technical  change  in
agriculture relative to non-agriculture,  and so on.  Specifying the factors  affecting
agricultural terms of trade is important because the TOT is a major  factor effecting
intersectoral resource transfers 8.
manufacturing share of GDP, expressed as an index) of 55 developing economies in
1970-1991.  This  cross-section analysis  clearly  shows  that  stable  TOT possibly
coupled with  the  stabilizing  effects of pricing policies can contribute  to  dynamic
changes in the industrial  structure.  Actually. in the Philippines, government price
interventions are motivated in part by the desire to stabilize prices.
8 David (1983)  ran a regression for the domestic terms of trade of agriculture relative to
manufacturing  with  the  following two independent  variables  in  the  case  of the
Philippines: (1)international terms of trade  (the ratio of world agricultural  prices to
world manufacturing prices) and (2)the official exchange rate  representing  domestic
economic  policies (sample period was 1950-80).  She found that  (1)international TOT
was statistically insignificant, (2)exchange rate was statistically significant and had a
positive relationship with the dependent variable.  The World Bank(1990) cited this
finding  and  suggested  that  government  pricing  policies,  the  exchange  rate  in
particular,  was crucial  in  determining  agricultural  incentives  in  the  Philippines.
However, the same regression done by authors shows completely  different results:
TOT(d)  = 0.979  + 0.321TOT(i)  - 0.007EXCH  adj.R2=0.78
(9.71)  (3.50)  (-2.52)
The (d) denotes  "domestic",  and the data for  world  agricultural  and manufacturing  prices  used to
calculate  international  (denoted  "(i)") TOT are from the HANDBOOK  OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE  AND  DEVELOPMENT  STATISTICS  (UNIDO). Figures  in parentheses  are t-values.
The sample  period  was 1970-1992.
Contrary  to the regression  by  David  (1983),  international  TOT  is statistically  significant  and
the coefficient  on the exchange  rate is negative. The exchange  rate can work  to improve  or
deteriorate  domestic  TOT depending  on various  conflicting  factors.  For example,  in economies
where  agricultural  commodities  are primarily  exported,  and manufacturing  activities  are highly
protected  making  them effectively  non-tradable,  devaluations  in the exchange  rate will benefit
domestic  prices  of agricultural  commodities  over  import-substituting  manufacturing  commodities
by  stimulating  agricultural  exports. On the other  hand,  domestic  manufacturing  prices  will  rise  to
53.  The Resource Allocation Mechanism Analyzed by Regional Data
The approach to finding intersectoral resource allocation by using regional data (the
"regional"  approach),  as  explained above,  is  taken  in  order  to  analyze  the
relationship  between  the  intersectoral  and  intrasectoral  capital  allocation
mechanisms.  Intersectoral  allocation  is  the  resource  allocation  between  the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and intrasectoral allocation is that between
large and small farms.
According to  Teranishi(1997), agricultural sectors  in East  Asian economies are
characterized by an  abundance of small farmers owning their own  land, where
resistance to policies unfavorable to agriculture is greater than in other economies,
leading to  a  pro-agriculture bias  against other  sectors.  We  try  to  verify this
political economic background in the intersectoral resource allocation analysis.
Table 4  shows some basic data for  14 geographical regions in the Philippines9.
This table also shows the aggregated data for 4 kinds of regional groups which are
(1)  industrial regions,  (2) large-farm-dominated (plantations) regions,  (3) small-
farm-dominated regions and (4) other agricultural regions.  These are classified
from their sectoral output shares and landholding siituations.  Here, by analyzing
the  interregional resource  allocation among the  4  groups,  we  can make  some
inferences about the political economy as mentioned above.
We can see that the relative per capita regional GDP of the non-agricultural regions
was significantly  higher than other regions (where the capital region--Metro Manila
reigned).  At the same time, the relative levels of per capita GDP and population
shares remained almost the same from 1975 to  1994.  Thus, it can be said that
there is no evidence that regional economies have been converging or diverging to
each other in the long term.
some  extent  through  the  import  of higher  priced  intermediate  injputs.
9 14  regions  are  divided  into  75  adniinistrative  provinces  by  the most  recent  classifications.
6The contrast among  the 4 groups in terms of sectoral output shares  and landholding
situations is "empirically  ambiguous".  Table 5 shows the sectoral distribution  of
output and Table 6  shows the "landholding  inequality index" by regions.  The
"Landholding  Inequality  Index" is measured as the ratio of the sum of farm areas
exceeding  10 hectares to total farm area.
First, Metro Manila can easily  be recognized  as a non-agricultural  region since  non-
agricultural  output accounts for 100% of its total output.  However, the national
average of the share of non-agricultural  output to total output was also quite high at
77.7%(1994), and other regions such as Central Visayas  (including  Cebu province
which recently has been attracting large amounts of foreign direct manufacturing
investments)  with 84.9% of its output non-agricultural,  are not agricultural  regions,
either.
Second, the composition of non-agricultural  output varies in each of the regions.
The manufacturing sector is shown because it is  the most  dynamic sector of
industry, and we have found that Metro Manila should  not have been considered  an
industrial region as its  share of  service output is  58.9% (the  share of  total
employment  in the services industry in Metro Manila -- not presented here -- is
about 70%).
Third, there are some regions which can be considered as belonging  to  different
groups at the  same time.  For example, the  Southern Tagalog region which
includes Quezon province in its borders has large coconut plantations, and this
region shows relatively  large landholding  inequality  (Table 6). However,  this region
has been categorized into the non-agricultural  group,  rather than the large farm
group which follows.
Putting aside  for the time being  the evaluation  of the service  sector in the two-sector
(agriculture-industry)  approach  and other related  problems,  we dare to define  the 4
groups of regions as follows,
1. Metro Manila, Central Luzon, Southem Tagalog and Central Visayas (in the
central  region of the Philippines)  as Non-agricultural  Regions
2. Bicol, Western Visayas, Western, Northern and  Southern Mindanao (in the
southern region of the Philippines)  as Large Farm Regions
3.  Ilocos and Cagayan Valley (including CAR, in  the northern region of the
Philippines)  as Small  Farm Regions
4. Eastern Visayas,  Central  Mindanao  as Other Agricultural  Regions
7Outcomes  of the findings  using the regional  approach  follow:
[Policy-based  capital outflows]
Table 7 shows the trends of policy-based  net capital  outflows (government  revenue
less government expenditure)  in the above-defined  4 regional groupsl'.  We can
also see that the central government maintained  a pro-agricultural  fiscal policy as
indicated by the positive sign of outflow only in industrial  regions.  Others show
negative  signs  which mean  there were net capital  inflows  into these  regions from the
government.
The second finding is that the relative size of capital inflows as a proportion to
regional GDP" was largest in small-farm-dominated  regions  relative to large farm
10  Data  is available  for 1979  to 1993  for policy-based  net capital  outflows  in 4 regions. Regional
tax data are collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).  BIR collections  account  for
around 70% of all national government  tax revenues.  On the olher hand, total regional allocation
of central government  expenditures  covers  only about 30% of total central government  expenditure,
and the remaining 70% is used for nationwide or interregional objectives.  Thus, this estimation
may overestimate  the net capital outflow  done by the central government.
Moreover, it should be noted that the regional tax data used here does not include tariffs,
export  taxes,the impact of trade quotas and of other various kinds of price controls which are not
necessarily tax measures, all of which are central to pricing policies and affect the domestic terms
of trade of agriculture and consequently  capital outflow.
"  I Components  of Expenditure  on Gross Regional  Domestic Product (1975-1993)  are available  from
the National Statistical  Coordination  Board.
The Components  are as follows:
1.  Personal Consumption  Expenditure
2.  Govermuent  Consumption  Expenditure
3.  Gross Value  in Public Construction
4.  Gross Value  in Private Construction
5.  Gross Domestic  Capital Formation in Durable  Equipment
6.  Gross Domestic Capital  Formation in Breeding  Stocks  and Orchard Development
7.  Changes  in Stocks
8.  Net Exports
8regions and others in almost all sample  years, except 1986, 88, 90, 91.  However,
even in these years, the capital  inflows  into small  farm regions were larger than into
plantation  regions.
These  trends reflected  the dramatically  increasing  public  expenditures  for agriculture
allocated  particularly  to irrigation.  Small  farm regions with relatively  large shares
of rice production captured large amount of these expenditures.  According to
David(1996),  irrigation  was the single  largest public  expenditure  item between 1974
and 1984.  In  1984, public expenditure for irrigation was close to  half of all
agricultural  public spending  and totaled 20% of the total infrastructure  budget, but
dropped sharply  around the mid-  1980s.  These  trends were reflected  particularly  in
the relative sizes of net public capital  inflows in small farm regions with relatively
large shares  of rice production  (Table 7).
Public expenditures for agriculture in real terms increased nearly fivefold in the
1970s  2.  Expressed as shares of gross value added in agriculture, and of total
government expenditures,  the increases were also dramatic.  That rapid growth
was surely motivated  by high world commodity  prices, and easy access to foreign
development  grants.  However, the main motive for the increase was the serious
food grain shortage in 1973.  As a result, the main beneficiary  of that increased
spending  was the rice subsector.
This background for resource flows does not support the hypothesis  presented by
Teranishi(1997).  The capital  allocation  as described  above can be attributed  not so
much to the power of the farmers  to resist policies  unfavorable  to agriculture  as to
the implementation  of policies  designed  to mitigate  the effects  of the rice shortage.
[Private  sector based capital  outflows]
The trends in private capital allocation draw quite a different picture, as can be
inferred  from Table 8.  Looking at the loans to deposits ratio of banks, above the
even or the highest  level of the ratio of non-agricultural  regions indicates  that private
capital has been transferred  from agricultural  regions into non-agricultural  regions.
In addition,  the ratio of small  farm regions  was lowest in almost  all sample  years.
It should  be noted, however,  that investments  in bonds and securities  by banks have
not been added to loan portfolios  due to data constraints,  although  these assets are
12David  (1996)  shows  the  central  government  expenditures  for  agriculture  (1965-95)  which  can  be
broken down according  to policy instruments,  i.e.. irrigation,  price stabilization,  research.
extention,  coconut  development,  livestock,  and others.
9similar to  deposits.  In  this case, the loan/deposit ratio  will be  undervalued,
particularly  in Metro Manila' 3.
The fact that private capital has been transferred  frorn agricultural  regions to non-
agricultural  regions is consistent  with the preceding  research  based on national  data.
The real and relative levels of agricultural loans granted have declined since the
latter half of the 1960s14, despite  government  intervention  through various special
agricultural  credit programs.  In addition,  the distribution  of loans have been  biased
in favor of larger farmers.
According  to  some surveys 15, and even in the case of the Rural Bank which was
established  to extend loans mainly to small farmers, 68% of the total loans were
received by high-income  farmers.  Moreover, because of the rapid inflation of
around 20% during the 1970s, interest rates were negative in real terms.  This
created an excess demand for loans, which limited  the flow of loans to agriculture,
especially  to small farmers, where costs of transactions and risks for lenders are
inherently  higher  (David 1983).
Direct  investment by  establishments also  shows the  same tendency. Capital
expenditures by  manufacturing corporations concentrated on  non-agricultural
regions  as indicated  by the per capita expenditures  in T'able  9.
4.  The Affects of Pricing  Policy on Capital  Allocation
Table 10 shows the percentage difference  between domestic and border prices as a
measure of government  price interventions  into some kinds of commodity  markets.
Border prices are the prices without government  interventions.  Table 11 shows
"3The loan/deposit  ratios  have  been  under  the even  level  in  all regions  after 1987  are possibly  due
to some other reasons.  The economic crisis of 1983-85 resulted in stricter banking regulations
which have limited the lending activities of banks.  For example, the reserve requirement  went as
high as 25% during this period and this accounts for the high 'due from Central Bank account".
On the other  hand,  caution  should  be taken  in evaluating  the loan/deposit  ratio in the Philippines,
because growth in agricultural loans historically came mainly from the Central Bank rediscount
window  rather than from additional  equity capital or savings deposits.
4  See David (1983), Table  9 (p45) which is based on unpublished  data
1 5 Neri and Llanto (1985)
10estimates  for the net price interventions  measured  as percentage  differences  between
value added at domestic and at border prices.  The latter protection rates are
presented because resource allocation is affected by effective rates of protection
which consider  not only the policy  effects  on output prices,  but also on intermediate
input prices.  Findings  from these  tables follow.
1. The agricultural sector has been placed under an incentive structure biased
significantly  in their favor compared  to the manufacturing  sector.
2. Price interventions  have not systematically  and consistently  been designed to
discourage all agricultural commodities  in the same manner, as the nature and
magnitude of the penalties  imposed on each commodity  were quite different from
each other.
3. Protection rates generally  declined  over time and rose again  in the late 1980s.
Point No. 2 seems  to be particularly  important  because  the political  economy  of the
government  pricing  policies or "divisible  benefits",  the main  interest of this project,
will  be drawn from the analysis  of the protection  function  of different  crops.  In this
respect, however, the World Bank (1990) pointed out that price interventions  in
agriculture  have not been motivated  by any systematic  bias toward special economic
interests.
The most important  characteristic  of Philippine  politics  is the "two factions  and one
party systemr"  described  as the predominance  of individual  loyalties  over economic
group interests  in the political  power structure,  where political  parties are supported
by people of similar  social and economic  strata.  Moreover, in terms of the landed
aristocracy  and great financial  conglomerates  (families),  the elite class which comes
from those strata had long ago branched  out into industry,  commerce,  finance  and so
on.  Hence, the bias of the class is not necessarily  for or against agriculture  or any
other economic  sector, for that matter.  Certainly,  a close link  between those with
political power and those  with economic power is  typical in the  Philippines.
However,  we were not able  to find any bias in terms of sectoral resource  allocations,
that has been consistently  supported  by these economic  powers.
Campos (1991) showed empirical  data to illuminate  the extent that landed families
controlled manufacturing activities while continuing to  engage in  land-based
productions.  He  showed that:  (1)  among the  87 stockholding families and
economic groups that  control the top  120 manufacturing firms, there are 22
indigenous families (excluding  foreign capital and Chinese-Filipino  families) and
family  groups with substantial  landholdings,  (2) these big landed capitalist  families
control 33% or 40 out of the 120 leading manufacturing  firms , and (3) many of
11them have  business  partnerships  with the other leading  non-landed  families  in the top
120 manufacturing  firms.
Based on the above observations,  the various levels of interventions should be
explained  not as being socio-politically  motivated  as Teranishi  (1997) explains.  A
complex set of interventions  was actually intended to achieve different kinds of
objectives, i.e.,  self-sufficiency  in  food  supply ,  price-stabilization, increased
government  revenues,  promotion  of agricultural  processing,  balanced  distribution  of
income  and so forth.
As previously  noted, the protection rates generally  declined  in the 1970s  and rose
again in the late 1980s.  This suggests that government  price interventions  were
done at least partially for price stabilization.  In the first half of the 1970s, when
booming world commodity  prices were coupled with exchange rate devaluations,
the government intervened to protect consumers from higher prices of tradable
agricultural  products.  The pricing  policies  that were biased for the consumer  (pro-
urban), had pro-farm  (pro-rural)  biases after the second half of the 1980s.
There are other factors responsible for price protection.  For example, in the
1980s, the protection rates of rice did not recover to  the level of the  1960s.
Protection policies  were in less demand  as there were productivity  gains in rice since
the late 1960s, and this transformed  the Philippines  from a net importer to a net
exporter of rice by the second half of the 1970s.  Government  investments in
irrigation  and extension  services  to disseminate  a new variety of fertilizer-responsive
rice were instrumental  in the lowering  of domestic  price.
Thus, at that point, the government no longer needed to  protect domestic rice
production.  We would like to argue that this reflects the government's  apparent
non-bias either for  or  against consumers.  Maintaining low  grains prices for
consumers  as well as assuring  adequate  price incentives  for producers were the twin
objectives  of pricing  policies.
5.  The  linkages  between  inter-  and  intra-sectoral resource  allocation
mechanism
We believe  one of the most important  issues  in resource allocation  in the Philippines
is the linkage between the inter- and intrasectoral  resource allocation mechanism.
Although  this research project sheds light  mainly  on the contribution  of intersectoral
(interregional)  resource allocation  to economic  development,  we can still point out
the undeniable  tie between the inter- and intrasectoral(iregional)  resource allocation
mechanism.
12In this  respect, Balisacan(1994) revealed that  the  inter-regional component of
overall inequality is  rather  small (no  more than  20%)  and the  intra-regional
contribution amounts to  about 80% in the Philippines 1 6. This outcome is quite
contrary to the common  perception  that much of the inequality  would be reduced by
policy reforms aimed at redressing the resource allocation gap among regions and
between rural and urban areas.
This finding also seems to have important implications  to the regional approach in
this study.  That is, it becomes unclear regional grouping to represent industries is
appropriate as  almost all income inequality possibly coupled with  unbalanced
resource  allocation is  unexpectedly attributed to  intra-regional (intra-sectoral)
factor, rather than interregional  (intersectoral)  factor.
According to  Ranis (1990),  a  relatively equal structure  of  income and  asset
ownership in agriculture (intrasectoral allocation) can contribute to  a  buoyant
market  for  rural  and  labor-intensive industries (intersectoral and  intraregional
allocation).  This  leads  to  a  spatial  balance of  development (interregional
allocation).  As these  observations indicate, intra-  and inter-sectoral resource
allocation  mechanisms  are related to each other.
Regarding the intra- and inter-sectoral resource allocation mechanism,  the role of
huge conglomerates,  constituting  a very unique  political and economic system  in the
Philippines, was  discussed.  No  radical  breach  taking  place  between  the
landowning  families  and the manufacturing  class, this capital brought a contradictory
set of interests into the ISI sector, weakening  the initial  social coalition for industrial
growth that could have directed  land-based  wealth into industrial capital.  Because
much landed capital was used for plantation agriculture for export, they opposed
16 Balisacan (1994) used the Theil index as measures  of inequality. The Theil index at the
national level can be decomposed  into within-group  (region)  contributions  and between-group
(region)  contributions  as follows,  Theil:  (1/n)Sln(Y/Yi)  = S(nj/n)Theil  (j) + S(nj/n)ln(YlYj)
=Theil  (w) + Theil  (b)
where  Yi is the expenditure  (or  income)  of person  i
n is population  size
Y is the arithmetic  mean  expenditure  (or income)
j is group  (region)
Theil (w)  is the Theil index  for within  group  (region)
Theil (b)  is the Theil index  for between  group  (region)
13exchange controls which had earlier supported the ISI.  In addition, as the main
opponents  of land reform  with redistributional  effects,  they failed to create a strong
domestic  market  which  would have been  the basis for sustained  industrial  growth.
It has been pointed out that this unique  system  is persistent  and has not changed  as
much as would have been expected  even after the collapse of the Marcos regime.
For instance, 20 years of the Marcos regime (1965-1986)  saw newly developed
economic  powers, called "Marcos cronies", coming from a  completely  different
background (non-landed  capitals)  from traditional ones (landed capitals).  In the
following  Aquino regime,  traditional  landed capitals  regained  their power.  In this
course, however,  their behavior  -- rent-seeking  -- has not changed  at all.  If this is
correct, it is difficult  to blame  intersectoral  resource allocation  changes  on changes
in the political  regimes.
6. Conclusion
In  this chapter, we  have provided an  overview of  the intersectoral resource
allocation in  the  Philippines and  also  touched ujpon the  political economic
backgrounds of these flows by  analyzing  regional data.  The most important
objective of this research was to provide  an analysis  of the intersectoral resource
flows  broken down into private  and public-based  resource  allocations.
The agricultural  sector has continued  to supply  capital  to the non-agricultural  sector,
and the total net transfers out of agriculture  grew signiiicantly  during  the first half  of
the 1970s.  The government  spent more in agriculture  than it gained  from taxation
of the sector in most years, but the magnitude  of government-led  inflows  was too
small  to compensate  for the capital  outflows  of the private sector.
Note that private based (market-based)  capital allocation  includes  various kinds of
anti-agricultural  direct and indirect  pricing policies  (excluding  tax-related policies
which are included  in policy-based  allocations).  Oftentimes,  public expenditures
including  concessional  credit programs and other types of subsidies  are  justified on
the basis that they mitigate  the penalties  imposed  on agriculture  by other economic
policies, particularly  price intervention  policies.  In the case of the Philippines,
however, the use of credit policies  to compensate  for the effects of policies that
worsen the terms of trade against food and agricultu:ral  exports will have lirnited
effects.
In the findings  of the regional  approach  taken in this project, it was interesting  that
the relative size of government-led  capital inflows was largest in the small farm
regions.  As mentioned  above, the relative concentration  of net public capital in
14small  farm  regions  does  not  concur  with  the  hypothesis  presented  by
Teranishi(1997).  This is because the capital allocation as described above can be
attributed not so much to farmers' wills to resist policies detrimental to agriculture,
as to the rapid growth of government expenditure for rice production after the "rice
crisis" in the  beginning of the  1970s.  This change was not dictated  by  specific
economic interest groups, but by political decisions driven by what the government
wanted to do to achieve national goals (World Bank 1990).
We think that a further discussion should be needed in terms of the evaluation of the
volume of capital allocation. The most important objective of this research was to
estimate  intersectoral  resource  allocation  and  then  to  evaluate  its  impact  on
economic development. However,  we  do  not have a  criteria to  evaluate policies
biased against or in favor of agricultural sector.  One solution may be international
comparison, but it is difficult to cover intersectoral resource flows in a same basis in
other sample countries due to data constraint.
Regarding  of  the  cause-and-effect  relationship  between  intersectoral  resource
allocation and  economic development, it is interesting to  find a close relationship
between  coefficients of variations of domestic agricultural terms of trade  and the
extent of changes of industrial structures in 55 developing economies as shown in
Figure  2.  Movements  in  intersectoral  terms  of  trade  can  influence  industrial
structures  by  their  effects on  intersectoral  resource  transfers.  So,  in general we
would like to argue that the balanced intersectoral resource flows are closely related
with the stability as well as the volume of relative resource allocation to agricultural
sector.
The important issues to be discussed in resource allocation in the Philippines is the
linkage  between  the  inter-  and  intrasectoral  resource  allocation  mechanism,
although this research project sheds light mainly on the contribution of intersectoral
(interregional)  resource  allocation  to  economic  development.  The  interregional
component  of  overall  income  inequality  possibly  coupled  with  imbalanced
intersectoral resource allocation is rather small in the Philippines. The most serious
problem  in  Philippine  has  been  the  imbalance between  the  rich  and  the  poor
(intrasectoral  imbalance)  rather  than  intersectoral  imbalance  because  both
agricultural and manufacturing sectors have been substantially covered by the rich
landed capitals.
A transfer of capital out of agriculture will lead to  sustained growth only if this is
done  efficiently  towards  more  socially  profitable  investments  coupled  with  a
relatively balanced income distribution. In the case  of Philippine, however,  some
great  financial conglomerates are criticized for creating highly oligopolistic market
structures which are seen as responsible for the inefficient resource use and uneven
15income  distribution. These  landed capitalists have  channelled massive state
resources into traditional economic activities like sugar and  coconut farming,
limiting  the country's industrial  diversification.
These viewpoints  seem to be justified by recent good economic  performances  in
Philippine.  Recent relatively  high growth rates are achieved  mainly  by deregulation
and relaxation  of restriction  President  Lamos  proceeds  positively,  which can change
oligopolistic  markets  to more competitive  resulting  in per capita income  growth and
more inflows  of foreign  direct investments  favoring  growing domestic  markets.  We
think a further investigation  should be needed to see how the previous social and
economic  systems  are changing  and how this structural  reforms  influence  the way of
intersectoral  resource  allocation.
16Appendix
Measuring  Net Capital Outflows  from Agriculture  to Non-Agricultural  Sector
Net  capital outflows from agriculture are  defined as  the  net  real resources
transferred from the agricultural to  non-agricultural  sectors, i.e., the difference
between  the food and raw materials  delivered  to the non-agricultural  sector and the
industrial  consumer  goods and industrial  inputs flowing  in the opposite direction.
The agricultural sector is defined to include the production and consumption of
crops, livestock and poultry,  fisheries  and forestry products.  The non-agricultural
sector consists  of the rest of the economy.
(A) Accounting  framework
The  following  is a description  of the sectoral  flows  in agriculture.
GOODS  INFLOWS  œEPENDfTRES  GOODS  OULRDWS  (INCOME}
[Agricultural  Production  Sector (APS)]
Xaa+Xna+Laa+Kaa+Kna+Xma =  Caa+Can+Xan+Xaa+Cae+Xae+Iaa  (1)
[Agricultural  household  sector (AHS)]
Caa+Cna+Ta+Sa+Cma  =  Laa+Lan+Kaa+Kan+Ga  (2)
By combining  equations  (1) and (2) and canceling  out similar  terms, the following
equation (3) for agricultural  sector  is obtained.
(Xan+Can+Xae+Cae)-(Xna+Cna+Xma+Cma)+(Kan-Kna+Lan)
- Sa-Iaa+Ta-Ga  (3)
Equation (3) states  that the trade surplus  in goods other than investment  goods plus
the trade surplus  in primary  inputs (land  and labor; Lna is assumed  to be negligible)
is equal to  savings  minus the accumulation  of stocks of agricultural  products in
agricultural  sector plus government  taxes minus expenditures. Next, to obtain the
net trade surplus  in agriculture,  (Ina+Ima)  is subtracted  from both sides  in equation
(3) since  (Ina+Ima)  is the trade deficit  in investment  goods. Thus:
(Xan+Can+Xae+Cae)-(Xna+Cna+Xma+Cma)+(Kan-Kna+Lan)-(Ina+Ima)
- Sa-Iaa+Ta-Ga-(Ina+Ima)  (4)
In equation  (4), Iaa+Ina+Ima=Ia. Leon (1982) assumes  there are no intersectoral
transfers of production  factors,  i.e., Kan-Kna+Lan=0. This assumption  may  be due
17to data constraints.  Furthermore,  we have to assurne  Ina+Ima=O,  as we cannot
find appropriate  allocations  to disaggregate  the total outputs of investment  goods
into agricultural  and non-agricultural  uses' 7. Then,  this equation can be rewritten
as,
(Xan+Can+Xae+Cae)-(Xna+Cna+Xma+Cma)  . (Sa-Ia)+(Ta-Ga)  (4')
the left-hand  side of the equation  (4') is estimated  by using Input-Output  tables.
[Notations  for the above  equation]
X:Intermediate goods,  C:Consumer goods,  I:Investment  (Capital  goods),
S:Savings,  K:Capital  (land),  L:Labor, T:Government  Tax, G:Government  Services,
a:Agriculture,  n:Non-Agriculture,  e:Exports,  m:Imports, and where there are two
subscripts,  the order indicates  the directions  of the flow, i.e., Xna denotes the flow
of intermediate  goods from non-agriculture  to agriculture.
(B)Estimation  Procedures  and Data Sources
Our estimation  procedures  are based on Leon (1982).  However,  Leon's approach
has been slightly  modified  here with respect to the coverage of G.  It should be
noted that the left side of equation  (4'), estimated  by 1-0 tables, is a trade balance,
not reflecting  a complete  IS balance  of agricultural  sector, since 1-0 tables do not
include transfers from government  to agricultural  sector.  The excluded transfers
are, for example,  government  expenditures  in infrastnacture,  research, agricultural
support services  and so forth.
To extract a complete  IS balance  (=current account) of the agricultural  sector, we
have to add the transfers that have been excluded to the trade balance.  Leon
(1982) estimated this portion of G by adding up central and local governments'
budgets which involved: 1) spending for  agricultural programs/activities,  i.e.,
expenditures of bureaus under the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of
Natural Resources, and 2) other spending, where there was no information  on
allocation, i.e., education, health, infrastructure, national defense, justice, etc.,
estimated by using the  allocators based on agriculture's share of  income, or
employment,  or an average  of the two.
17Leon(1982)  derives  (Ina+Ima)  by "adding up all the output of industries  producing  capital goods
that are used  in  the  various agricultural subsectors.  These industries include machinery,
transport  equipment,  and construction (p44 and Appendix  F)".  However,  there is no information
on how these  outputs should  be allocated..
18We, on the other hand, chose to use government transfer data (T-G) from the World
Bank  (1990)18.  This is because Leon's  approach is likely to  lead to  inaccurate
estimates  of  transfers  from  government  to  agriculture  because  it  includes
government's  own  consumption,  and  some  statistics  show  that  infrastructure
expenditures  are  concentrated  in  industrial  areas,  not  always  proportionate  to
sectoral share of GDP and employment.
Intersectoral flows of C, X are calculated as follows:
(a)Can, Cna
Consumption expenditures on agricultural and non-agricultural goods (CA, CN) are
broken  down  as  CA=Caa+Cna  and  CN=Cnn+Cna.  CA,  CN  can  be  obtained
directly from the  I-0  tables.  To  find  Can  and  Cna,  the  ratios  (Can/CA),  and
(Cna/CN) are estimated from the Family Income and Expenditure  Surveys (FIES).
The FIES provides percentage shares of expenditure on food and non-food items by
farmer  and  non-farmer  households in their  total  spending.  Food  and  non-food
correspond  to  agricultural and  non-agricultural goods  respectively.  In  addition,
farmer  and  non-farmer  households  are  used  to  represent  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural households respectively.
(b)Xan, Xna
Xan, Xna can be found in 1-0 Tables.
18 World  Bank (1990),  pp.259-262, Table  5.7. Table  5.8
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20Table 1 Sectoral  Composition  of Gross Domestic  Product and Employment  in Philippines  (%)
GDP  1955  1965  1975  1985  1990
Agriculture  33.22  30.22  26.92  28.64  26.67
Industry  25.66  28.09  33.79  32.61  33.48
Manufacturing  18.63  21.21  24.98  24.21  24.66
Services  41.12  41.69  39.29  38.75  39.85
Employment
Agriculture  60.04  57.57  54.28  49.52  45.21
Industry  15.67  14.76  14.74  14.11  16.61
Manufacturing  12.37  11.31  10.97  9.59  10.21
Services  24.29  27.67  30.98  36.37  38.18
Note: Three-year  averages, centered  around  the year shown
Source:  Balisacan  (1993)
21Table 2(a) Growth  Rates of Agricultural  GDP,  Labor  Force, P:roductivity  (1977-90)
and Share in GDP  (%)
Share  of Agriculture  in GDP  (%)  Average  Annual  Growth  Rate
Decline(%),  Agricultural
1977  1990  1977-90  GDP  Labor  Productivity
Philippine  26.4  23.9  9.6  1.7  2.4  -0.7
Korea  24.8  10.6  57.2  0.7  -3.8  4.5
Indonesia  27.6  21.2  23.1  3.9  2.8  1.1
China  41.9  30.4  27.4  5.1  1.4  3.6
Thailand  23.5  15.2  35.4  4.0  2.2  1.8
Malaysia  25.1  18.7  25.7  3.5  -1.0  4.4
Taipei  9.5  4.0  57.9  1.4  -3.1  4.4
Singapore  1.5  0.3  78.2  -4.3  -8.8  4.6
Bangladesh  46.3  41.3  10.7  1.8  2.9  -1.1
SriLanka  30.6  26.5  13.4  1.6  1.8  -0.2
India  40.5  31.5  22.1  2.8  0.3  2.5
Pakistan  31.6  25.5  19.4  4.5  2.2  2.3
Note:  China  is for 78-90,  Malaysia  for 78-90, Bangladesh  for 77-86, Sri Lanka  for 81-90
Source: Asian Development  Bank,  Key  Indicators  of Developing  Asian and Pacific  Countries  1995,
World  Bank,  World  Tables  1994
Table  2(b) Growth  Rates of Manufactural  GDP,  Labor  Force,  Productivity  (1970-90)
and Share  in GDP  (%)
Share  of Manufacture  in GDP  (%)  Average  Annual  Growth  Rate
Growth  Rate(%),  Manufactural
1970  1990  1970-90  GDP  Labor  Productivity
Philippine  25  25  0  3.5  3.1  0.4
Korea  21  31  48  13.8  6.3  7.5
Indonesia  10  20  100  12.9  6.6  6.3
Thailand  16  26  63  9.8  7.3  2.4
Malaysia  12  27  125  10.5  7.8  2.7
Singapore  20  29  45  8.9  4.3  4.6
Bangladesh  6  9  50  2.3  4.7  -2.4
India  15  18  20  5.7  2.9  2.8
Pakistan  16  17  6  6.4  1.6  4.7
Note:  Shares  of Manufacture  in GDP of India  and Pakistan  are at purclhaser  values.
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  World  Tables,  various  years
22Table 3  Net Public and Private Capital Outflows from Agriculture,
1961-1982 (% of Agricultural GVA)
Trade balance  Government-led Transfers  Total flows  Private  Public
year  (S-I)+T  Revenue(T)  Expenditure(G)  (S-I)+(T-G)  S-I  T-G
61  6.20  1.32  2.24  3.96  4.87  -0.92
62  7.41  1.42  1.68  5.73  5.99  -0.26
63  8.76  1.66  2.91  5.85  7.10  -1.25
64  11.55  1.70  3.25  8.30  9.85  -1.55
65  12.12  1.48  2.66  9.46  10.64  -1.18
66  13.36  1.43  2.28  11.08  11.93  -0.85
67  14.27  1.34  2.07  12.20  12.93  -0.73
68  13.63  1.41  1.94  11.70  12.22  -0.52
69  13.21  1.05  2.37  10.84  12.17  -1.32
70  16.53  2.48  2.80  13.73  14.06  -0.32
71  20.91  2.83  2.59  18.32  18.08  0.24
72  25.19  2.07  3.30  21.89  23.12  -1.23
73  26.04  2.37  4.10  21.95  23.67  -1.73
74  27.84  6.18  4.57  23.27  21.66  1.61
75  27.50  4.43  4.55  22.96  23.07  -0.11
76  28.19  3.77  4.48  23.72  24.42  -0.71
77  28.76  4.46  5.09  23.67  24.30  -0.63
78  28.74  4.49  5.76  22.98  24.25  -1.27
79  29.28  3.47  5.63  23.65  25.82  -2.16
80  30.03  6.52  5.63  24.39  23.51  0.89
81  31.11  5.19  5.88  25.23  25.92  -0.69
82  30.50  2.20  5.18  25.32  28.30  -2.97
Note: Trade Balance is estimated from 1-0 tables of 1961, 65, 69, 74, 79, 83.
The estimates for in-between 1-0 years are obtained by straightline interpolation.
Public transfers  are from World Bank (1990)
23Table 4  Regional  GDP (RGDP) and Regional  Population  Shares in Philippine
RGDP,Per Capita  (avg.=100)  1975  1980  1985  1990  1994
Philippines  100  100  100  100  100
NCR METRO MANILA  246  241  226  236  227
CAR CORDILLERA  100  105
[1]ILOCOS  REGION  62  65  61  52  51
[2]CAGAYAN  VALLEY  72  73  58  56  49
[3]CENTRAL  LUZON  91  88  94  93  97
[4]SOUTHERN  TAGALOG  118  115  111  112  119
[5]BICOL  REGION  40  42  47  47  43
[6]WESTERN  VISAYAS  79  79  80  79  82
[7]CENTRAL  VISAYAS  76  78  81  87  89
[8]EASTERN  VISAYAS  43  42  50  48  45
[9]WESTERN  MINDANAO  65  60  62  56  58
[10]NORTHERN  MINDANAO  102  105  97  89  88
[11]SORTHERNMINDANAO  129  114  109  95  95
[12]CENTRAL  MINDANAO  78  81  83  66  71
Pop.
Density
Populationshare(%)  1975  1980  1985  1990  1994 of  1994
Philippines  100.0  100.0  1)0.0  100.0  100.0  223
NCRMETRO MANILA  11.8  12.3  12.7  13.1  13.1  13,799
CAR CORDILLERA  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  68
[1]ILOCOS  REGION  6.5  6.1  7.1  5.8  5.6  294
[2]CAGAYAN  VALLEY  4.0  4.0  4.6  3.9  4.0  101
[3]CENTRAL  LUZON  10.0  10.0  1.0.0  10.2  10.0  368
[4]SOUTHERN  TAGALOG  12.4  12.7  13.0  13.6  13.3  191
[5]BICOL  REGION  7.6  7.2  7.2  6.4  7.1  271
[6]WESTERN  VISAYAS  9.9  9.4  9.3  8.9  9.2  303
[7]CENTRAL  VISAYAS  8.1  7.9  7.7  7.6  7.4  331
[8]EASTERN  VISAYAS  6.2  5.8  5.6  5.0  5.4  168
[9]WESTERN  MINDANAO  4.9  5.3  5.2  5.2  5.2  185
[10]NORTHERN  MINDANAO  5.5  5.7  5.8  5.8  5.9  141
[I I]SORTHERN  MINDANAO  6.5  7.0  7.0  7.3  7.1  150
[12]CENTRAL  MINDANAO  4.9  4.7  4.8  5.2  4.8  139
RGDP,Per  Capita (avg.=100)  1975  1980  1985  1990  1994
Philippines  100  100  100  100  100
Non-Agr.(NCR,CL,ST,CV)  139  138  136  139  141
Large(BIC,WV,WM,NM,SM)  81  80  79  75  74
Small(IL,CAG)  66  68  60  53  50
Others(EV,CM)  58  59  65  57  57
Population  share (%)  1975  1980  1985  1990  1994
Philippines  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Non-Agr.(NCR,CL,ST,CV)  42.3  42.9  43.3  44.5  43.8
Large(BIC,WV,WM,NM,SM)  34.3  34.6  34.6  33.7  34.5
Small(IL,CAG)  12.4  12.0  11.8  11.6  11.5
Others(EV,CM)  11.1  10.5  10.4  10.3  10.2
Source: Philippine  Statistical  Yearbook,  various years
24Table 5  Sectoral Distribution of Output by Region, 1975, 85, 94  (%)
Non-agriculture  Manufacture  Services
1975  1985  1994  1975  1985  1994  1975  1985  1994
Metro Manila  100  100  100  42.3  37.0  33.5  45.6  54.1  58.9
[I]ILOCOS REGION  60.8  63.6  56.9  5.6  10.8  5.8  38.2  35.2  41.8
[21CAGAYAN  VALLEY  54,0  55,3  46.0  4.5  5.1  4.0  34.4  35,1  34.6
[3]CENTRAL LUZON  78.8  78.6  76.6  31.6  28.7  30.5  35.4  37.4  34.1
[4]SOUTHERN TAGALOG  72.4  69.9  73.5  35.1  29.1  31.6  26.9  30.5  29.6
[5]BICOL REGION  52.5  56.1  62.1  1.5  1.4  1.3  39.0  36.8  40.4
[6]WESTERN VISAYAS  64.1  64.4  65.2  21,9  19.1  15.0  37.5  39.4  42.2
[7]CENTRAL VISAYAS  84.7  84.1  84.9  24.7  21.6  21.4  48.6  51.0  54.3
[8]EASTERN VISAYAS  59.2  61.9  66.7  10.8  22.2  22.8  35.3  31.4  34.1
[9]WESTERN MINDANAO  46.9  46.5  50.5  9.4  9.0  8.3  32.1  32.7  33.6
[IOJNORTHERN MINDANAO  61.8  62,4  62.9  25.7  19.8  20.0  30.4  32.2  35.9
[ 1]SORTHERN MINDANAO  51.0  53.1  59.5  17.1  16.8  15.5  28.9  31.0  35.9
[121CENTRAL  MINDANAO  55.4  54.81  56.2  26.0  22.2  22.3  24.2  23.2  24.0
Philippines, average  75.3  75.4  77.7  28.3  25.2  24.8  36.9  40.4  42.7
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, various yearsTable 6 Landholding  Inequality  Index  (%)
1980  1990
Philippines,  average  26  24
[1]ILOCOS  REGION  12  6
[2]CAGAYAN  VALLEY  23  13
[3]CENTRAL  LUZON  9  12
[4]SOUTHERN  TAGALOG  28  25
[5]BICOL  REGION  35  28
[6]WESTERN  VISAYAS  38  33
[7]CENTRAL  VISAYAS22-  1
[8]EASTERN  VISAYAS  23  20
[9]WESTERN  MINDANAO  25  26
[1O]NORTHERN  MINDANAO  28  26
[11]SORTHERNMINDANAO  32  29
[12]CENTRAL  MINDANAO  f106  21
Note: Landholding  inequality  is expressed  as the ratio of the sum
of farm area of farms larger than 10 hectares  to the total farm
area in the region. Shadowed  boxes are under the national average
Source:  Census of Agriculture
26Table 7  Central Government  Revenue from minus  Expenditure to Regions  (% of Regional GDP)
Regional Gruops  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Non-Agri(NCR,CL,ST,CV)  4.5  4.6  4.4  2.1  3.3  4.0  5.0  4.6  5.6  5.8  6.3  7.8  7.5  8.4
Large(BIC,WV,WM,NM,SM)  -2.9  -4.0  -3.4  -4.8  4.0  -2.7  -2.4  -2.8  -4.3  51  -5.0  -3.4  -4.0  -4.3
Small(IL,CAG)  -83  -10.3  -9.5  -115  -10.7  71  -5.8  -6.4  -9.2  -10.9  -11.1  -79  -9.5  -9.7
Others(EV,CM)  -7.3  -8.9  -8.7  -10.9  -8.6  -. 5  -5.7  -. 9  -9.7  -10.7  -11.9  -8.4  -9.3  -9.2
Note: Data for 1987 is not available
Minus  means  inflows to regions
Source: Annual Financial Report of the National Government,  Annual Report of Bureau of Internal Revenue,  various years
Table 8  Loan Portfolio to Deposit  Ratio of Banking  Oflious
Regional Gruops  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  19921  1993  1994
Non-Agri(NCR,CL,ST,CV)  1.46  1.48  1.43  1.33  1.44  1.31  1.52  1.45  1.13  1.13  0.74  0.77  0.77  0.84  0.82  0.80  0.87  0.89
Large(BIC,WV,WM,NM,SM)  1.50  1.35  1.42  1.52  1.59  1.46  1.39  1.08  1.00  0.84  0.66  0.63  0.60  0.57  0.53  0.60  0.65  0.68
t)  Small(IL,CAG)  1.21  1.09  1.04  1.05  1.02  0.98  0.91  0.75  0.63  0.54  0.45  0.38  0.40  0.37  0.36  0.36  0.52  0.59
Others(EV,CM)  1.16  1.18  1.23  1.40  1.37  1.23  1.22  0.96  0.83  0.57  0.43  0.41  0.32  0.33  0.37  0.41  0.46  0.52
Souce: Fact Book Philippine Financial System.  various yearsTable 9  Numbers  of Establishments  and  Capital  Expenditures  in Manufactures
(1)  Numbers  of Establishments  Per  Capita
Region  1960  1970  1985  1990*  1975**  1980**
PHULIPPINES,  Average  0.070  0.059  0.050  0.172  1.830  1.774
Non-Agri. (NCR, CL, ST, CV)  0.143  0.113  0.077  0.305  2.093  1.991
Large (BIC, WV, WM, NM, SM)  0.023  0.021  0.035  0.075  1.591  1.502
Small (IL, CAG)  0.009  0.010  0.012  0.063  2.275  2.439
Others (EV,CM)  0.035  0.032  0.019  0.041  1.071  1.023
(2) Capital Expenditures Per Capita (Pesos)
Region  1960  1970  1975  1985  1990*  1980**
PHILIPPINES, Average  9.1  35.7  81.5  128.5  494.6  157.2
,s  Non-Agri. (NCR, CL, ST, CV)  18.9  53.1  152.1  219.6  893.3  270.5
Large(BIC,WV,WM,NM,SM)  3.0  37.1  38.3  28.4  173.7  118.9
Small (IL, CAG)  1.1  1.4  8.0  30.5  100.5  44.0
Others (EV,CM)  4.2  7.9  27.4  192.5  267.2  131.4
Note:  (*) is for establishments with employment  of 10 or more, (**) is for all size.
Others are for only large farms
Source: Annual Survey of Establishments, various yearsTable 10 Nominal  Protection  Rates of Selected  Agricultural  Commodities,  1960-92
60-64  65-69  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-92
Rice  38  10  -I  -11  -8  11  16
Corn  46  38  19  30  25  67  62
Copra  0  0  -12  -22  -28  -6  -3
Sugar  30  123  -26  -15  37  155  89
Bananas  0  0  -4  -4  -4  0  0
Pork  54  50  18  -7  9  43  31
Chicken  104  122  58  57  67  57  94
Source:  David (1996)
Table 11 Estimated  Effective  Protection  Rates
Agri.  Manu.  All
1974  9.0  44.0  36.0
1983  10.3  79.2  52.8
1985  9.2  74.1  49.3
1986  5.0  61.2  39.8
1988  5.2  55.5  36.3
Source:  David  (1996)
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Source:  Philippine  Statistical  Yearbook,  various yearsFigure 2  The Relationship Between Coefficients of Variations of Domestic Agricultural Terms of Trade  and Changes in Industrial  Structures for
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